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ABSTRACT
In this article, we reassess the court’s role in the withdrawal of clinically assisted nutri-
tion and hydration from patients in the permanent vegetative state (PVS), focussing on
cases where health-care teams and families agree that such is in the patient’s best inter-
est. As well as including a doctrinal analysis, the reassessment draws on empirical data
from the families of patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness, on economic
data about the costs of the declaratory relief process to the National Health Service
(NHS), and on comparative legal data about the comparable procedural requirements
in other jurisdictions. We show that, following the decision in the Bland case, the role of
the Court of Protection is now restricted to the direct supervision of the PVS diagnosis
as a matter of proof. We argue that this is an inappropriate role for the court, and one
that sits in some tension with the best interests of patients. The blanket requirement of
declaratory relief for all cases is economically expensive for the NHS and thus deprives
other NHS patients from health care. We demonstrate that many of the ancillary bene-
ﬁts currently offered by declaratory relief could be achieved by other means. Ultimately,
we suggest that reform to the declaratory relief requirement is called for.
KEYWORDS: Disorders of consciousness, PVS, Life-sustaining treatment, Best
interests, Court of Protection, Declaratory relief
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I . INTRODUCTION1
According to Anthony Maden, ‘much of medical ethics consists of coming to terms
with scientiﬁc discoveries.’2 The same might be said of medical law. The need to
adapt to scientiﬁc and technological innovation is a charge often levelled at law in its
relationship with medicine.3 What represents a therapeutic advance for medicine
might, at the same time, pose a problem for law4—one that challenges the law to
respond with its own innovations. An example of this, which forms the focus of this
article, is the capacity of medicine to sustain the lives of patients in the permanent
vegetative state (‘PVS’). Since the development of this diagnostic category in the early
1970s,5 legal systems across the world have had to grapple with a number of acutely
difﬁcult questions, the most challenging of which is whether the law should permit
the continuation or termination of the treatments sustaining the life of such patients.
In some jurisdictions, legal developments have been prompted or informed by high-
proﬁle and tragic cases,6 England and Wales amongst them. The situation of Anthony
Bland, the young football fan catastrophically injured in the Hillsborough disaster, was
the subject of the House of Lords’ ﬁrst consideration of an application to withdraw
the medical treatment that was sustaining the life of a patient in the PVS.7 As is now
well known, the court established a lasting precedent that it is not in such a patient’s
best interests to be maintained in life by clinically assisted nutrition and hydration
(‘CANH’) and that it is lawful to discontinue it.
In the 20 or so years since the decision in Bland, the legal expectation in England
and Wales has been that the court should be involved by way of declaratory proceed-
ings in every decision to withdraw CANH from patients in the PVS, even where fam-
ilies and health-care teams agree that it is an appropriate course of action. The
1 We are very grateful to Penney Lewis and Lynne Turner-Stokes who read and commented on earlier
drafts. The analysis also gained much from the feedback of York Law School colleagues in its ‘Brown Bag’
internal seminar series. We are also very grateful to a number of national experts who helped us with the
law in other jurisdictions: Kathy Cerminara (USA), Stefano Civitarese and Alessandra Pioggia (Italy),
Ruth Horn (France and Germany); Mary Donnelly (Ireland), Ben White and Lindy Willmot (Australia),
Herman Nys (Belgium), Andre Dias Pereira (Portugal), Melanie Slabbert (South Africa), Sirpa Soini
(Finland), Avraham Steinberg (Israel), David Stephenson (Scotland), and S.V. Joga Rao (India). Finally,
we are grateful to our colleagues in the Chronic Disorders of Consciousness Research Centre who com-
mented on this work while in progress, particularly Derick Wade, Celia Kitzinger, and Jenny Kitzinger.
2 A Madon, ‘England’s New Mental Health Act Represents Law Catching Up with Science: A Commentary
on Peter Lepping’s Ethical Analysis of the New Mental Health Legislation in England and Wales’ (2007) 2
Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in Medicine 16.
3 MH Shapiro, ‘Is Bioethics Broke?: On the Idea of Ethics and Law “Catching up” with Technology’ (1999)
33 Ind. L. Rev. 17; L Bennett Moses, ‘Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change: The
Example of In Vitro Fertilization’ (2005) 6 MJLST 505; L Bennett Moses, ‘Recurring Dilemmas: The
Law’s Race to Keep Up with Technological Change’ (2007) 7 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 239.
4 S Harmon, ‘Consent and Conﬂict in Medico-Legal Decision-Making at the End of Life: A Critical Issue in
the Canadian Context’ (2010) 60 U. N. Brunswick L. J. 208.
5 B Jennett and F Plum, ‘Persistent Vegetative State After Brain Damage: A Syndrome in Search of a Name’
(1972) 1 Lancet 7753.
6 In the USA, for example, the cases of Quinlan (In the Matter of Karen Quinlan, an Alleged Incompetent 70
N.J. 10 (1976)) and Schiavo (Schindler v Schiavo 780 So 2d 176, 177 (Fla Dist Ct App.), 2001)); in India,
the case of Shanbaug (Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v Union Of India (2011) 4 SCC 454); and in Italy, the
case of Englaro (Cassazione—Sentenza N° 21748/07 (Caso Englaro)).
7 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
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application for declaratory relief was originally framed in Bland as a matter of good
practice. However, it is now a matter of legal obligation.8 A Practice Direction issued
under the authority of the Court of Protection Rules 20079 stipulates that:10
Cases involving any of the following decisions . . . should be brought to the court:
(a) decisions about the proposed withholding or withdrawal of artiﬁcial nutri-
tion and hydration from a person in a permanent vegetative state or a minimally
conscious state . . .
The termination of CANH of patients in the PVS can, of course, be a sensitive issue. It
can be the source of distress and disagreement within families,11 between family members
and doctors,12 or between doctors and other medical staff and carers.13 Equally, there are
cases where medical experts cannot agree on the diagnosis.14 That such uncertainties and
disputes should be resolved in the court is uncontroversial. However, the requirement that
the court must consider all PVS cases, even in the absence of disputes or diagnostic dis-
agreement, is not without controversy. British clinicians, it seems, are largely of the view
that once a patient’s vegetative state has been diagnosed as permanent, and where the
family is in agreement, it should be possible to withdraw treatment without recourse to a
court.15 Indeed, recent British Medical Association (BMA) guidance is explicit about this:
As expertise and professional guidelines develop on PVS, the BMA can see no
reason to differentiate between decisions for patients in PVS and those for
patients with other very serious conditions where ANH is not considered to be
a beneﬁt, which are currently governed by established practice without the need
for legal review . . . The BMA hopes that in future the courts will decide that
PVS cases no longer inevitably require court review, where consensus exists, as
long as such withdrawal is in accordance with agreed guidelines.16
Professor Bryan Jennett (to whom responsibility for the diagnostic category is
ascribed and who gave evidence in the Bland case)17 also questioned the continued
8 W v M and others [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam).
9 S.I. 2007/1744.
10 Practice Direction 9E, paragraph 5. Except for the additional mention of the minimally conscious state,
this mirrors the terms of the Mental Capacity Act 2005′s Code of Practice (sections 6.18 and 8.18).
11 For example, Re G [1995] 2 FCR 46.
12 For example, NHS Trust v D [2005] EWHC 2439.
13 For example, Re C [2010] EWHC 3448 (Fam); Re J [2012] All ER (D) 146 (Nov.).
14 For example, Re D (Medical Treatment) [1998] 2 FLR 36; NHS Trust A v H [2001] 2 FLR 501.
15 A Grubb and others, ‘Survey of British Clinicians’ Views on Management of Patients in Persistent Vegeta-
tive State’ (1996) 248 Lancet 35.
16 British Medical Association, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment: Guidance for
Decision Making (Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 3rd edn, 2007), 61.
17 Jennett and Plum (n 5) 734. Jennet, however, notes that he was not the ﬁrst to report the condition that
has come to be known as PVS. See B Jennett, ‘A Quarter Century of the Vegetative State: An International
Perspective’ (1997) 12 J. Head Trauma Rehabil. 1.
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blanket requirement of declaratory relief in the jurisdictions of the UK.18 Such is not
required, he suggested, in any other jurisdiction outwith the UK.19
Legal scholars have also criticised the blanket requirement.20 Penney Lewis has
queried the value of declaratory relief in uncontested cases in the light of its likely eco-
nomic costs to the National Health Service (NHS) and the potential emotional costs
to families. She has also questioned its rationality within the context of English
medical law, pointing out that in other situations decisions to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment do not require judicial approval:
What is special about PVS cases? Absent any judicial attempt to rationalize the
special treatment of such cases, one can only speculate as to whether the rule
requiring judicial approval in such cases reﬂects particular concern or is simply
the result of historical accident . . . The judicial decision simply rubber-stamps
the decision reached by the medical staff and the patient’s family, having con-
ﬁrmed the diagnosis of PVS. The need to go court may cause distress to the
patient’s family and is expensive for the NHS.21
It is now over 40 years since the diagnostic category of PVS was established, and over
20 years since the English courts’ ﬁrst involvement in ‘best interests’ decisions to with-
draw CANH from patients in the PVS. Our aim in this article is to re-assess compre-
hensively the value of the English courts’ continued involvement in cases where
families and clinicians agree that the withdrawal is appropriate. A key task in an overall
assessment of value, of course, is to identify the factors to be taken into account.
Thus, we will consider the claims of Jennett and Lewis: (1) that English law is out of
kilter with international legal trends, (2) that the requirement in relation to with-
drawal of CANH from patients in the PVS is incoherent within the context of English
medical law, (3) that it may be distressing for patients’ families, and (4) that the pro-
cedure is economically expensive for the NHS. However, we must also consider con-
trasting claims that are made in favour of the requirement of declaratory relief. These
we can ﬁnd in the case law. The Bland case was explicit in setting out the justiﬁcations
for the process. In the House of Lords, Lord Goff approved a statement of Sir
Thomas Bingham MR in the Court of Appeal regarding the propriety of declaratory
relief.22 Sir Thomas Bingham, in turn, was approving the ruling of Sir Stephen Brown
P at ﬁrst instance that declaratory relief should be sought in all cases:
This was in my respectful view a wise ruling, directed towards the protection of
patients, the protection of doctors, the reassurance of patients’ families and the
reassurance of the public.23
18 B Jennet ‘Should Cases of Permanent Vegetative State Still Go to Court?’ (1999) 319 BMJ 796.
19 Jennett (n 17).
20 See R Huxtable, ‘“In a Twilight World”? Judging the Value of Life for a Minimally Conscious Patient’
(2014) 39 J. Med. Ethics 565.
21 P Lewis ‘Withdrawal of Treatment from a Patient in a Permanent Vegetative State: Judicial Involvement
and Innovative “Treatment”’ (2007) 15 Med. L. Rev. 392, 396, and 397.
22 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, per Lord Goff at 873.
23 Ibid, 815.
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This article proceeds by examining these contrasting claims about declaratory relief,
exploring the extent to which they are merited. We then discuss these claims in rela-
tion to each other and come to an overall assessment about the value of the court’s
involvement in these cases. Ultimately, we argue that the blanket requirement for
declaratory relief should be reformed.
I I . RESEARCH METHODS
Before moving on to examine the claims about declaratory relief, we must ﬁrst con-
sider the issue of research methods. As we can see, the claims made for and against
the blanket declaratory relief requirement are of different types: some are legal and
some empirical. And of the empirical claims, some are sociological and some eco-
nomic. Here, we set out the research methods used to produce our various analyses.
To understand family responses to this issue, we draw on a series of publications
from the Chronic Disorders of Consciousness Research Centre (of which we are a
part) that have analysed in-depth narrative interviews with family members who have
experience of having a relative in a prolonged disorder of consciousness, including the
PVS. In addition to academic publications, there are summaries of key ﬁndings from
this body of work, and ﬁlm clips from some interviews, available online to the public
as an educational resource at www.healthtalk.org. Of particular relevance to this
article is the online page about ‘family experiences of applying to court for treatment
withdrawal’, and we cite some of this online material where readers can hear and see
ﬁlm clips from the interviews for themselves.24
As regards our economic analysis,25 we draw heavily on previous NHS cost ana-
lyses for patients with severe and complex neurological disabilities based on the
Needs and Provision Complexity Scale (NPCS) and the Northwick Park Care Needs
Assessment.26 The NPCS is a tool for measuring the needs of patients with long-term
neurological conditions and estimating the cost of meeting those needs. For our own
24 For a full description of the methods and sample for this research, see the publications referenced: n 54, n
64, n 76, n 117, and n 130. Although it is not actually known how many cases of declaratory relief there
have been in England and Wales, the sample of families represented within this body of work is likely to be
fairly small in relative terms—5–10% of the whole depending on which estimate of the whole is assumed
to be correct. In 2004, the government reported ﬁgures in response to a Parliamentary question (HC Deb
09 February 2004, vol. 417, c1208W). In the 11 years since the ﬁrst case (1993–2004), there had been 36
applications for declaratory relief (including the Bland case). Eight cases have been reported since then.
However, many judgments in the Court of Protection are never reported, and we know that some deci-
sions about CANH withdrawal from PVS patients have been among them. It has recently been estimated
that there have been more than 100 cases since Bland: C Kitzinger and J Kitzinger, ‘Family Perspectives on
Proper Medical Treatment’ in S Fovargue and A Mullock (eds), The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment:
What Role for the Medical Exception? (Taylor and Francis: London 2015, in press).
25 A full description of our costing methods is provided in A Formby, R Cookson, and S Halliday, Cost Ana-
lysis of the Legal Declaratory Relief Requirement for Withdrawing Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration
(CANH) from Patients in the Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) in England and Wales (Research Paper 108,
Centre for Health Economics, University of York, 2015).
26 L Turner-Stokes, K Nyein, and D Halliwell, ‘Care Needs Assessment—A Directly Costable Outcome
Measure for Rehabilitation’ (1999) 13 Clin. Rehabil. 253; L Turner-Stokes, A Bill, and R Dredge, ‘A Cost
Analysis of Specialist Inpatient Neurorehabilitation Services in the UK’ (2012) 26 Clin. Rehabil. 256; L
Turner-Stokes, P McCrone, DM Jackson, and RJ Siegert, ‘The Needs and Provision Complexity Scale: A
Multicentre Prospective Cohort Analysis of Met and Unmet Needs and Their Cost Implications for
Patients with Complex Neurological Disability’ (2013) 3 BMJ Open, doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2012-002353.
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‘micro-costing’, we also obtained data on the unit costs of resource use from Unit
Costs of Health and Social Care 2012.27 We have further made assumptions about
particular cost parameters based on information from the recently published Royal
College of Physicians’ (RCP) best practice guidance for patients with prolonged dis-
orders of consciousness28 and consultation with medical specialists with experience of
the declaratory relief process. These specialists include two neurologists with experi-
ence as expert witnesses in PVS cases held at the Court of Protection. For the legal
costs, standard legal administrative fees were identiﬁed from information published
on the website of the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary. Published information on legal
fees for barristers and solicitors and medical expert witness costs were not available,
so we made assumptions based on discussions and correspondence with three barris-
ters and two solicitors who have been involved in several PVS cases of declaratory
relief.
Our comparative legal analysis is based in the ﬁrst instance on a review of English
language literature. We then supplemented this with data from ‘national rapporteurs’
in additional jurisdictions. The use of national experts or rapporteurs to obtain legal
data about foreign jurisdictions is an established research method in both legal29 and
social policy30 research. It enables a level of descriptive comparison within a group of
jurisdictions on a particular question of positive law. We contacted legal experts in a
range of common law and European civil law jurisdictions. The responses we received
are reported below.
I I I . CLAIMS IN FAVOUR OF DECLARATORY RELIEF
In this section, we explore in more detail the claims in favour of the declaratory relief
process even where families and health-care teams agree that CANH withdrawal is in
the best interests of the patient.
A. The Protection of Patients
The claim in the Bland case that declaratory relief would operate to protect patients
referred to the protection of life. Declaratory relief would protect patients from
unwarranted withdrawal decisions, knowing that withdrawal leads to death. Although,
as a legal principle, the sanctity of life must sometimes yield to competing princi-
ples,31 it remains a fundamental element of medical law.32 Accordingly, given the
27 LA Curtis, ‘Unit Costs of Health and Social Care 2012’ (Personal Social Services Research Unit, 2012)
<http://www.pssru.ac.uk/project-pages/unit-costs/2012/> (last accessed 29 January 2015).
28 Royal College of Physicians, Prolonged Disorders of Consciousness: National Clinical Guidelines (RCP:
London 2013).
29 See, eg, A Böcker and E Guild, Implementation of the Europe Agreements in France, Germany, the Netherlands
and the UK: Movement of Persons (Platinium Publishing Limited: London 2002); VV Palmer, ‘From Ler-
otholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ (2005) 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 261; BJ
Rodger, ‘Art 234 and Competition Law: A Comparative Analysis’ (2008) 15 Masst. J. Eur. & Comp. L.
149.
30 See, for example, M Adler and P Henman, ‘Computerizing the Welfare State’ (2005) 8 Inform. Commun.
Soc. 315; C Skinner and J Davidson, ‘Recent Trends in Child Maintenance Schemes in 14 Countries’
(2009) 23 IJLPF 25.
31 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
32 W v M and others [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam).
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relative novelty of the diagnostic category of PVS at the time and the ethical chal-
lenges associated with the withdrawal/withholding of life-sustaining treatments, the
House of Lords in the Bland case judged that declaratory relief was an appropriate
requirement of good medical practice—but only until a body of experience and prac-
tice had built up that would render the direct oversight of the courts unnecessary.
As we know, the question of whether it is in the best interests of a PVS patient to
be kept alive through CANH is now settled as a matter of law.33 Equally, as a matter
of formal medical knowledge, the diagnostic category of PVS is now well settled.34
However, in the context of the court’s role in protecting patients’ lives, we might still
question whether diagnostic ‘method’ is settled as a matter of formal medical knowl-
edge. Is there any critical debate within the medical community about appropriate
diagnostic method and, if there is, does declaratory relief have any role in resolving it
in order to be sufﬁciently conﬁdent in a particular PVS diagnosis? Equally, even if the
issue of diagnostic method is settled, we might also question whether, as a matter of
medical ‘practice’, it is observed sufﬁciently well to produce routinely reliable diagno-
ses. In other words, to what extent (if any) does the declaratory relief process offer
greater conﬁdence with respect to the PVS diagnosis?
1. Diagnostic Method
At the heart of the standard process of diagnosing prolonged disorders of conscious-
ness are the observation and assessment of patients’ behaviour (or lack thereof).35
The extent of patients’ awareness of self and environment is assessed by observations
of how they respond (if at all) to various external stimuli. With the arrival of brain
imaging technology, however, researchers have been able to observe more directly the
functioning of the brains of patients in disorders of consciousness. The best known
studies have used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to analyse the
brains of patients who have been asked to imagine different tasks (such as playing
tennis). These have produced striking results. In a 2006 study,36 for example, the
neural responses of a patient previously diagnosed as being in a vegetative state
(though not a PVS) were found to be similar to a healthy volunteer. In a 2010
study,37 two patients who would otherwise have been considered as being in a vegeta-
tive state were found to be able wilfully to modulate brain activity. Such studies have
led to considerable (albeit often exaggerated and inaccurate) media reports.38 They
have also caused some medical researchers to question the quality of the behavioural
method for diagnosing prolonged disorders of consciousness.39 Further, the Ofﬁcial
33 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
34 RCP (n 28).
35 Ibid.
36 AM Owen and others, ‘Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State’ (2006) 313 Science 1402.
37 MM Monti and others, ‘Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness’ (2010) 362
N. Engl. J. Med. 579.
38 G Samuel and J Kitzinger, ‘Reporting Consciousness in Coma: Media Framing of Neuro-scientiﬁc
Research, Hope, and the Response of Families with Relatives in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious
States’ (2013) 3 JOMEC J. 1.
39 See, for example, J Giacino and others, ‘Behavioral Assessments in Patients with Disorders of Conscious-
ness: Gold Standard or Fool’s Gold?’ (2009) 177 Prog. Brain Res. 33.
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Solicitor raised their signiﬁcance during the declaratory proceedings of B NHS
Trust v J,40 though the matter ultimately was not pursued.
This growing body of literature has subsequently been reviewed by a working party
commissioned by the RCP. It noted that, although brain imaging should continue to
be an important focus for research, the research has so far focussed on relatively small
numbers of patients. It concluded that brain imaging has not yet reached a stage of
development where it could be considered as part of routine clinical practice:
It remains unclear whether brain imaging is capable of informing the diagnosis
beyond clinical and behavioural assessment and whether these techniques have
any prognostic utility.41
For the time being at least, then, we can regard the matter of diagnostic method as
being settled and authoritatively stated for England and Wales by the clinical guidelines
of the RCP.42 Declaratory relief does not operate to protect patients in this respect.
2. Diagnostic Practice
The question of the accuracy of routine diagnostic practice has also been the subject
of a number of studies by medical researchers. In 1993, Childs et al.43 reported that
37% of patients (18 of 49) referred to a US neurorehabilitation unit had been
incorrectly diagnosed as either comatose or in what was then termed a ‘persistent’
vegetative state. In 1996, Andrew et al. published a study44 that took place in a UK
rehabilitation unit for those with profound brain damage, including the vegetative
state. They reported that 43% (17 of 40) of patients referred to the unit with a referral
diagnosis of vegetative state were subsequently found not to be such. Both of these
studies are now relatively old. However, in 2009, Schnakers et al.45 reported, based on
a study of patients in Belgium, that diagnostic ‘accuracy’ had not improved since the
earlier studies, suggesting that 41% (18 out of 41) of patients had been inaccurately
diagnosed as being in a vegetative state.
The claims of medical researchers that there is such a high rate of ‘misdiagnosis’
have, understandably, proved rather alarming for medical lawyers.46 However, we
must interpret these studies with care. The focus of the studies of both Childs et al.
40 [2006] EWHC 3152 (Fam). After consultation with an expert witness, the Ofﬁcial Solicitor ultimately con-
cluded that it would not be in the interests of J to undergo an fMRI scan.
41 RCP (n 28) 28.
42 Ibid. These guidelines have been endorsed by the following bodies: the Association of British Neurologists,
the Association for Palliative Medicine, the British Society of Rehabilitation Medicine, the Chartered
Society of Physiotherapy, the College of Occupational Therapy, the Society of British Neurological Sur-
geons, and the Society for Research in Rehabilitation.
43 NL Childs, WN Mercer, and HW Childs, ‘Accuracy of Diagnosis of Persistent Vegetative State’ (1993) 43
Neurology 1465.
44 K Andrews and others, ‘Misdiagnosis of the Vegetative State: Retrospective Study in a Rehabilitation Unit’
(1996) 313 BMJ 13.
45 C Schnakers and others, ‘Diagnostic Accuracy of the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious State: Clinical
Consensus Versus Standardized Neurobehavioural Assessment’ (2009) 9 BMC Neurology 35.
46 See, for example, C Borthwick ‘The Permanent Vegetative State: Ethical Crux, Medical Fiction?’ (1996)
12 Issues L. & Med. 167; A Bisset-Johnson and P Ferguson, ‘Striving to Keep Alive? Care and Treatment
Decisions Affecting Severely Handicapped Patients in Britain’ (1997) 4 EJHL 321; J Keown, ‘The Legal
8 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
 by guest on Septem
ber 15, 2015
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
and Andrews et al. was on diagnoses of vegetative states, but not PVSs as we now
know it. In the UK, vegetative states are now generally not deemed to be permanent
until at least 12 months after a traumatic brain injury and 6 months after a non-
traumatic brain injury.47 Yet, the Childs et al. study included patients whose brain
injuries had not yet reached this timeline.48 Likewise, with the Andrews et al. study, as
Wade49 has pointed out, 9 of their 16 ‘misdiagnosed’ patients on whom data could be
presented50 were discovered to have communicative abilities before 12 months had
elapsed since the onset of coma. In others words, it is possible that the cases in these
studies were accurately diagnosed as ‘vegetative’ prior to referral, with patients’ (not
unexpected) emergence from the vegetative state occurring after referral. Equally, it is
possible, as Childs et al. acknowledge, that diagnostic ‘inaccuracy’ is actually a result of
confusion on the part of referring physicians about terminology.51
The study of Schnakers et al. fuses the issues of diagnostic practice and diagnostic
method. Their claim about continued high rates of misdiagnosis is based on their
ﬁnding that the use of a structured assessment tool as part of the diagnostic process pro-
duces different outcomes when compared with diagnoses that were based on a consen-
sus amongst a medical team that arose from their daily (but unstructured) observations
of patients. The key message from their research is that a structured assessment tool
should be used in diagnosis in order to produce more reliable diagnoses. Yet, this is also
the clear guidance from the RCP’s recent clinical guidelines. Indeed, the RCP recom-
mends the systematic application of at least two validated structured assessment tools
before the diagnosis of PVS is made.52
The RCP’s guidelines also note that the choice of assessment tool to be used will
depend on the degree of ‘certainty’ needed for the decision in hand:
For example, assessment to support applications to the Court of Protection for
withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) has critical
impact on a serious and irrevocable decision. The Court will rightly expect a
high level of certainty with respect to diagnosis.53
This reveals another reason for less alarm in the face of these research studies’ head-
lines: the social reality of diagnosis is that it is an instrumental practice,54 in the sense
that clinicians diagnose for particular purposes. Diagnosis for the purposes of referral
Revolution: From “Sanctity of Life” to “Quality of Life” and “Autonomy”’ (1998) 14 J. Contemp. Health
L. & Pol’y 253; R Huxtable ‘Withholding and Withdrawing Nutrition/Hydration: The Continuing (Mis)
Adventures of the Law’ (1999) 21 JSWFL 339.
47 RCP (n 28).
48 The criterion for inclusion in the study was that the brain injury was more than 1-month old.
49 See D Wade ‘Misdiagnosing the Persistent Vegetative State’ (1996) 313 BMJ 943.
50 In relation to one of the ‘misdiagnosed’ patients, Andrews et al. were not granted permission to report
data.
51 See also Wade (n 49).
52 The court has also made this a requirement of diagnostic procedure prior to seeking declaratory relief:W v
M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam).
53 RCP (n 28) 25.
54 For an extended discussion of what the authors term a ‘diagnostic illusory’, see S Nettleton, J Kitzinger,
and C Kitzinger, ‘A Diagnostic Illusory? The Case of Distinguishing Between “Vegetative” and “Minimally
Conscious” States’ (2014) 116 Soc. Sci. Med. 134.
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to another medical unit, then, may not be of the same quality or conﬁdence as diagno-
sis for the purposes of deciding whether to withdraw CANH. In other words, high
rates of ‘misdiagnoses’ at early stages of patients’ disorders of consciousness will not
necessarily translate into high rates of inappropriate withdrawals of CANH.
Nonetheless, diagnosis of the PVS is still a challenging and complex process. It
should involve the interpretation of data from a range of sources, with the input of
various health-care disciplines.55 The interpretive process that culminates in a diagno-
sis requires considerable expertise for it to be conducted properly.56 Furthermore,
although there are good reasons to be cautious about the rates of ‘misdiagnosis’
reported above, our discussions with experienced clinicians indicate that this diagnos-
tic expertise for PVS is not widespread within the UK, perhaps due to the relative
rarity of the disorder. Indeed, the number of clinical experts who have given diagnos-
tic evidence in declaratory relief proceedings is very small indeed. The names that
have appeared in recent case law can be counted in single ﬁgures, though the number
of clinicians with the requisite expertise will, of course, be higher. But the challenges
associated with diagnosis of PVS and the relatively small pool of expertise within the
UK raise the question of whether a sufﬁcient ‘body of practice’ (to frame it in the lan-
guage of the Bland case) has built up to render the direct oversight of the courts
unnecessary. The Ofﬁcial Solicitor always commissions an expert review of the diag-
nostic evidence as part of the declaratory relief proceedings. Usually, this supplements
an expert review that the applicant (usually the NHS Trust) has already commis-
sioned, sometimes using the same small pool of experts from which the Ofﬁcial Solici-
tor draws. It is clear, then, that the declaratory relief process has so far ensured
considerable conﬁdence in the PVS diagnoses prior to CANH being withheld or with-
drawn. What is unclear, it is suggested, is whether the same quality and conﬁdence of
diagnosis would be achieved in every case, were it not for the declaratory relief
process. It would certainly be possible for the guidelines of the various medical profes-
sional bodies to recommend a second-opinion procedure as they have done for
CANH decision for patients who are not in the PVS (see further below). Equally, the
RCP’s recent clinical guidelines about diagnosing disorders of consciousness can guide
and structure the diagnostic process. Nonetheless, until such times as the medical pro-
fession itself is conﬁdent of both the existence of widespread diagnostic expertise within
England and Wales, and of routine adherence to the RCP’s guidelines, we have to con-
clude that declaratory relief offers greater conﬁdence in PVS diagnoses.
B. The Protection of Doctors from Liability
The coroner responsible for dealing with the fatal cases of the Hillsborough disaster
warned the doctor treating Anthony Bland (Dr Howe) that he may face criminal
charges if he were to take action to bring Bland’s life to an end. As Dr Howe has sub-
sequently recorded:57
55 RCP (n 28) 14.
56 Wade (n 49); E Racine and others, ‘Observations on the Social and Ethical Aspects of Disorders of Con-
sciousness’ (2010) 37 Can. J. Neurol. Sci. 758.
57 J Howe, ‘The Persistent Vegetative State, Treatment Withdrawal and the Hillsborough Disaster: Airedale
NHS Trust v Bland’ (2006) 6 Pract. Neurol. 238.
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He made it clear that he ‘. . . could not countenance, condone, approve or give
consent to any action or inaction which could be, or could be construed as
being, designed or intended to shorten or terminate the life of this young man.
This particularly applies to the withholding of the necessities of life, such as
food and drink’. [. . .] He sent copies of his letter to the Chief Constable [. . .]
and my defence society. On the following day I was visited at the hospital by a
detective from Keighley Criminal Investigation Department (CID). He
informed me that if I withdrew treatment and Tony died, I would be charged
with murder.
It was on the basis of these warnings and further legal advice that Airedale NHS Trust
sought declaratory relief in the Bland case. Given the legal uncertainty at the time, this
was a prudent course of action on the Trust’s part. As is well known, the court, in
granting the declaration of lawfulness, was able to give Dr Howe and the NHS Trust
the certainty they needed.58 But, of course, the Bland decision also set a precedent
that should give certainty to other NHS Trusts faced with similar patients. It is now
settled law that the withdrawal or withholding of CANH from patients in the PVS
does not give rise to criminal liability for the consequent death of the patient.59 The
legal cause of death is the event(s) that led to the vegetative state and not the with-
holding or withdrawal of CANH. The best interests justiﬁcation for taking invasive
steps to continue treating patients expires when the vegetative state becomes perman-
ent. As the Supreme Court recently framed it on a related issue:
If the treatment is not in [the patient’s] best interests, [i]t . . . follows that (pro-
vided of course that they have acted reasonably and without negligence) the
clinical team will not be in breach of any duty towards the patient if they with-
hold or withdraw it.60
Declaratory relief, then, we can conclude, is no longer necessary for the protection of
doctors from criminal or civil liability. Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, given that the
point of substantive law is now settled, the requirement of declaratory relief probably
gives rise to another form of liability: liability for contempt of court. The declaratory
relief requirement is now a legal obligation that, by deﬁnition, introduces the possibility
of non-compliance that would not otherwise be there.
C. The Reassurance of Patients’ Families
When reading case law, legal scholars are naturally drawn to the legal reasoning of a
court’s judgment. However, there is very little of this in the judgments relating to
straightforward declaratory relief applications (where all parties are in agreement).
58 For a more sceptical reading of the Bland case in this respect, see J Bridgeman ‘Declared Innocent?’
(1995) 3 Med. L. Rev. 117.
59 See A Grubb ‘R v Bingley Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Morrow’ (1995) 3 Med. L. Rev. 86 for a discussion
of the unsuccessful attempt by Rev. Morrow to require the Bingley Magistrates to issue a summons against
Bland’s doctors for murder.
60 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, para. 22.
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As we noted above, in cases where the patient is deemed to be in the PVS, the court
does not engage in the difﬁcult ‘balance sheet’ deliberations that lead to a best inter-
ests determination. Instead, the focus of the Court of Protection in these cases is on
the diagnosis as a matter of proof. The fact that there is very little legal reasoning in
these cases should encourage us to observe what other functions these judgments
might be performing. The reassurance of patients’ families is one such function that
continues to be performed, it is suggested. Although it is not an entirely uniform
feature of this body of case law, with practices varying between particular judges, it is
nonetheless common for judges in these cases to practice what some legal scholars
have termed ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’.61 In other words, in deciding what to say in a
judgment, judges clearly have in mind its emotional impact on the families of the
patients concerned.
In the Bland case, Butler-Sloss LJ suggested that Anthony Bland existed in a ‘twi-
light world’.62 Lord Goff described his state as a ‘living death’.63 These descriptions of
the PVS as neither fully life nor fully death accord with interview data with relatives of
patients. For many, the ontological status of their relatives is not settled or clear.64 In
this context, the judgments of the court in PVS cases take on a ceremonial function in
formally moving the relative on from this state of limbo, from a twilight world towards
full death. Indeed, in some important ways, the judgments often contain elements
that one might commonly ﬁnd in funerals or services of remembrance. For example,
judgments often contain an element of eulogy whereby the patient is formally remem-
bered. Some excerpts from recent cases illustrate this point:
CW . . . is described as being self contained, sensitive, quiet, shy and as having
‘so much depth of character and love’. . . CW cared for a number of pets and
had a great love of animals. He enjoyed playing sport, rugby, hockey and cross
country running at school and doing practical things such as helping his father
with outdoor tasks, art, painting, stage scenery for school productions and, in
particular, mechanical and engineering projects. He liked to take things apart
and make things . . . His sister states that ‘CW was quiet but if you talked about
engineering or mechanics you could not shut him up’.65
AW was a very active person. She ran a catering business. She was a keen sports-
woman, who used to play squash and one year she ran the London marathon.
She enjoyed music and dance . . . she will always be remembered as the unique
and dynamic person that she was before she became so seriously unwell . . .66
61 See, for example, DB Wexler and BJ Winick, Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Caroline University Press,
Durham 1991); DB Wexler, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview’ (2000) 17 T. M. Cooley L. Rev.
125.
62 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 816.
63 Ibid, 863.
64 S Holland, C Kitzinger, and J Kitzinger, ‘Death, Treatment Decisions and the Vegetative State: Evidence
from Families and Experts’ (2014) 17 Med. Health Care Philos. 413.
65 Re C [2010] EWHC 3448 (FAM).
66 NHS Trust v AW [2013] EWHC 78 (COP).
12 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
 by guest on Septem
ber 15, 2015
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
It is also common for the family to be afﬁrmed as being devoted to and loving of the
patient:
Her devoted family have been assiduous in their attendance at the hospital and
in their attempts to attain some sort of response from her. There have been
many efforts to see if she had any ability to respond to those around her.67
JD’s only surviving relative . . . is her cousin, who, along with his wife, also
supports the application. They have been devotedly visiting JD regularly and
frequently over the last two years.68
The loss to the family and the sadness of their situation are also commonly
acknowledged:
the members of the family—not only those who have taken the trouble to
come to court today—but others who are not here, and are feeling it just as
much, I have no doubt, will be looking at the end of a life of a member of a
family who was very dear to them.69
The last four and a half years have been very hard for AW’s family, but their
moving statements show that she is very much loved . . . 70
And, ﬁnally, an assurance is often given that the death of the patient is the right
course of action: indeed, that somehow medicine has interrupted the proper course
of events. The underlying narrative here is that nature has determined that death must
occur, and neither medicine nor law should stand in its way. The implication, it is sug-
gested, is that no one—neither the family nor the medical team—need feel guilty or
responsible:
It seems to me that no understanding of life is complete without an understand-
ing of the proper place of death within that, and it is a human trait to desire
what we commonly call ‘a good death’ . . . I propose to grant the authorisation
on the basis that artiﬁcial medicines should now withdraw and the natural order
should be allowed to complete its course.71
The sympathies of this court go out to all of the family, friends, healthcare prac-
titioners and carers who will be deeply affected by this decision. However, it is
time for there to be peace.72
67 NHS Trust v I [2003] EWHC 2243 (Fam).
68 Re JD [2012] EWHC 4420 (Fam).
69 NHS Trust v I [2003] EWHC 2243 (Fam).
70 NHS Trust v AW [2013] EWHC 78 (COP).
71 Trust A v M [2005] EWHC 807 (Fam).
72 Re C [2010] EWHC 3448 (FAM).
Court’s Role in the Withdrawal of Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration • 13
 by guest on Septem
ber 15, 2015
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
We can see, then, that although these judgments can be light on legal reasoning, they
can contain a great deal of therapeutic jurisprudence. There are three main forms of
what might be called ‘therapeutic beneﬁts’. First, we can see that the declaratory relief
judgments often operate as memorials of the living dead that anticipate the funerals that
will follow in due course. The judgment of the court performs a function of ceremoni-
ally moving the family on from a state of limbo. Second, it also offers the family a formal
afﬁrmation of the extreme difﬁculty of their situation and the reality of their suffering.
Emotionally, this can be signiﬁcant. There is evidence of the comfort and reassurance
that these judgments can give. For example, in one of the interviews for ‘healthtalk.org’,
we are able to observe a relative’s response to a declaratory relief judgment. Cathy was
the sister of a PVS patient and is ﬁlmed reading the judgment for the ﬁrst time (about
16 years after the event), having been presented with the transcript by the researcher.
To fully appreciate the emotional impact of the judgment, one should watch the
video.73 Nonetheless, the text of her words also conveys something of what she felt:
I do remember how kind everybody was at the court and how they talked a lot
about the sort of level of care of Matthew and the devotion and the tragedy,
which is what—[reads from court transcript] ‘it’s a very moving account of how
the family had to face the appalling tragedy which confronted them and how they
had to live with the day-to-day knowledge which grew upon them that there
would be no hope of recovery’. That’s a good way of describing it: it’s a knowl-
edge that grows upon you. Last paragraph, he says: ‘I would like to express my
appreciation of the tremendous care which has been given to M by his mother,
father and sister and to express what I’m sure all those in court will wish to be
associated with the very greatest admiration for their courage and the care which
they’ve given to him [tearful]. I believe the time has come when the reality of the
position must be recognised and accordingly, I make the declarations’ . . . I think
it [the court judgment] is very well and almost rather beautifully expressed.
Cathy’s statement also touches on the third way in which declaratory relief can be
reassuring for relatives: as we saw above, the judgments often stress the appropriate-
ness of letting the patient die. Research shows that family members often do not want
to seek withdrawal of CANH. They hope instead that somehow ‘nature’ will take its
course: for example, that death would come by way of an infection (albeit
untreated).74 So, when a decision is ﬁnally made to permit death by withdrawal of
CANH, the fact that this decision is made by the court can be signiﬁcant. For such
relatives, the jurisdiction of the court can help them not to feel responsible for the
patient’s death. It is important to recognise that, despite the difference in law between
withdrawal of CANH and killing (which we discuss further below), these legalities
mean little for relatives. For them, withdrawal of CANH is as much a way of ‘doing it’
(ie killing the patient) as would be a lethal injection. (Indeed, the prospect of
73 <http://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-brain/family-experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-
conscious-states/family-experiences-applying-court-treatment-withdrawal> (last accessed 29 January 2015).
74 C Kitzinger and J Kitzinger, ‘Withdrawing Artiﬁcial Nutrition and Hydration from Minimally Conscious
and Vegetative Patients: Family Perspectives’ (2014) J. Med. Ethics, doi:10.1136/medethics-2013-101799.
14 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
 by guest on Septem
ber 15, 2015
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
withdrawing CANH is often deemed abhorrent, whereas lethal injection is often con-
sidered humane.)75 So, as our previous research has shown, for some the declaratory
relief process shielded them from a sense of guilt:
. . . if the Court of Protection wasn’t there to say, ‘Well we are making the ultim-
ate decision and this is what we decide’, I would always feel that it was me
who’d actually chosen to do it. And that would be hard . . . It would have been
so hard to live with that, knowing that—almost feeling that you’d sentenced
them to death, however much they wanted it. So the Court of Protection has
shielded me from that experience, which is good.76
Although, as we note further below, the prospect of court hearings can be intimidating
for some relatives, it is also clear that many of them are subsequently positive about
their experiences. Declaratory relief, it seems, continues to operate as a reassurance
for (at least some) patients’ families.
D. The Reassurance of the Public
Another of the beneﬁts of the declaratory relief process suggested by the courts in the
Bland case was the reassurance of the public. In the context of that case, this is under-
standable. It was the ﬁrst UK case to consider the dilemma of whether to continue
treating a PVS patient with CANH. It was reasonable, then, for the courts to speculate
that their direct supervision of such medical decisions may reassure the public that
appropriate decisions were being made. Nonetheless, any continued suggestion
within the context of legal reasoning that the public needs reassurance on these issues
(with the implication that declaratory relief can provide it) would be a legal ﬁction—
an assertion of fact that operates for the purposes of legal reasoning but is not neces-
sarily true.77 The reality is that we must remain agnostic about this.
Nonetheless, there is a reason to believe that there may be a continuing need for
the reassurance of a signiﬁcant minority of the general public. In the USA, between
2003 and 2005 when a similarly high-proﬁle case (that of Terri Schiavo) was receiving
sustained media attention, surveys suggested that between 27 and 42% of Americans
were opposed to the withdrawal of CANH from the patient in the PVS, with 29%
viewing CANH withdrawal as murder.78 Unfortunately, comparable data do not exist
in relation to the UK, and it can be risky to ‘read across’ too easily from another
culture. However, we do know that some of the Parliamentary debates during the
passage of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 featured concerns that withdrawal of CANH
could amount to, or lead to, euthanasia.79 Equally, the joint committee of both
Houses of Parliament reporting on the Bill recommended that the court always
75 Ibid.
76 Quoted in S Halliday, C Kitzinger, and J Kitzinger, ‘Law in Everyday Life and Death: A Socio-Legal Study
of Chronic Disorders of Consciousness’ (2014) 35 LS 55, at p. 65.
77 On legal ﬁctions, see LL Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford University Press: Stanford 1967).
78 R Blendon, J Benson, and M Hermann, ‘The American Public and the Terri Schiavo Case’ (2005) 165
Arch. Intern. Med. 2580.
79 See, eg, HL Deb 10 January 2005, vol. 668 cc11-26; HL Deb 15 March 2005, vol. 670 cc1275-324; HL
Deb 17 March 2005, vol. 670 cc1441-76.
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consider CANH decisions for patients in the PVS.80 It is, surely, reasonable to main-
tain the House of Lords’ speculation in Bland that a not-insigniﬁcant proportion of
the general public continue to be troubled by the prospect of allowing patients in the
PVS to die.
Why might there be lingering discomfort for some sections of society about
CANH withdrawal from patients in the PVS despite 20 years of legal clarity since
Bland? Clearly, it relates (in part at least) to individual ethical convictions and/or reli-
gious doctrine81 on the issue. However, the more important point here, we suggest, is
that such ethical standpoints may be underpinned by the difﬁculty of the legal reason-
ing in this ﬁeld. What causes the death of the patient when CANH is withdrawn?
Legally, the answer is the underlying brain injury that led to the PVS. But culturally,
the answer is more likely to be the withdrawal of CANH itself. This is, no doubt, why
in the case of W v M, the patient’s sister felt able to express a preference for letting
‘nature take its course’ (by not treating infections) rather than CANH withdrawal.82
Legally, of course, the two courses of action are the same. It is also why family
members often equate withdrawal of CANH with killing.83 One of the interviewees
featured on ‘healthtalk.org’, for example, described her hopes that her mother would
die ‘naturally’, without the need for CANH withdrawal:
I was probably hoping in the back of my mind, that she would take the initiative,
she would have a heart attack and die. And that would be the resolution . . . I
think it was mentioned that she might have—after we’d withdrawn the stroke—
anti stroke tablets, my thought was, she’ll die. She’ll have another severe bleed
or—I’m not even sure how it works. I thought she’d die. That’s ﬁne, that will
happen and she will die, it’ll be ﬁne.
Interviewer: And her dying from a stroke or a heart attack would be better
because?
It was her decision, not mine [laughs]. It was, you know, the body’s saying. Not
me having to say, make this blasted decision all the time. Her body giving up
because it was just giving up, it had said, ‘I’ve had enough of life, I’ve had
enough of living like this,’ that’s it.84
It makes common (rather than legal) sense to perceive CANH withdrawal from PVS
patients as the cause of death. Pointing to the difference between causation in law and
causation in fact is unlikely to persuade anyone other than lawyers. As the RCP’s
recent clinical guidelines puts it:
80 Joint Committee Report on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill, Session 2002-3, vol. 1 (HL Paper 189-1, HC
1083-1), para. 129.
81 See R Barry, ‘The Papal Allocution on Caring for Persons in a "Vegetative State"’ (2004) 20 Issues L. &
Med. 155.
82 W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam), para. 116.
83 See Kitzinger and Kitzinger (n 74).
84 <http://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-brain/family-experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-
conscious-states/artiﬁcial-nutrition-and-hydration/> (last accessed 29 January 2015).
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The difﬁculty is that the longer a treatment is in place, the more it feels
‘normal’. Hence withdrawal of CANH may seem like a new or separate cause of
a death. . .85
IV. CLAIMS AGAINST DECLARATORY RELIEF
We can now examine in more detail the claims against a blanket requirement of
declaratory relief, the ﬁrst of which is that English law is out of kilter with the inter-
national trend.
A. Is English Law Out of Kilter with the International Trend?
The speciﬁc question explored here is whether foreign jurisdictions required recourse
to the courts in cases where (1) the prior wishes of the patient about treatment have
not been formally recorded or established, and (2) the relevant parties (families, sur-
rogate decision-makers, clinicians, etc.) agree that the withdrawal of CANH is the
appropriate course of action. These conditions correspond to the usual situation
encountered in England and Wales. Although the Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides
both for the grant of surrogate decision-making power86 and for the legal effect of
advance decisions,87 only a tiny proportion of the population of England and Wales
have done either.88 In none of the reported cases were these applicable.
A fair amount has been written on this question. Jennet, for example, tells us that an
international meeting in 1994 revealed that treatment withdrawal without recourse to
the courts was accepted practice in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Japan.89 The same
is true of New Zealand,90 the Netherlands,91 and South Africa.92 Similarly, in the
USA93 and Australia,94 where the relevant jurisdictions are state level, court proceedings
are not required. Northern Ireland, by way of contrast, however, follows England and
Wales in requiring declaratory relief.95 On the basis of the national rapporteur data we
received, we can also report that routine recourse to the courts before CANH can be
withdrawn is similarly not required in the following jurisdictions: Belgium, Finland,
85 RCP (n 28) 61.
86 Via the grant of a Health and Welfare Lasting Power of Attorney: Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 24.
87 Ibid, ss. 9–11. Note, however, that, under s. 11(8) an attorney can only refuse life-sustaining treatment if
the grant of the power of attorney expressly provides for this.
88 Currently only 4% of the population of England and Wales report having made an Advance Decision and
only 4% report having appointed anyone as their Health and Welfare Lasting Power of Attorney (YouGov
2013; <http://www.compassionindying.org.uk/knowledge-end-life-rights-and-choices-yougov-poll2013>)
(last accessed 29 January 2015).
89 Jennett (n 17).
90 LWillmott, BP White, and J Downie, ‘Withholding and Withdrawal of “Futile” Life-Sustaining Treatment:
Unilateral Medical Decision-Making in Australia and New Zealand’ (2013) 20 JLM 907.
91 S Gevers, ‘Withdrawing Life Support from Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State: The Law in the Nether-
lands’ (2005) 11 EJHL 347; I de Beaufort, ‘Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State – A Dutch Perspective’
(2005) 352 N. Engl. J. Med. 2373.
92 MN Slabbert,Medical Law in South Africa (Wolters Kluwer: The Netherlands 2011).
93 A Meisel and KL Cerminara, Right to Die: The Law of End-of-Life Decisionmaking (Aspen Publishers:
New York, 3rd edn, 2004); S Rode ‘End-of-Life Decisionmaking for Patients in Persistent Vegetative
States: A Comparative Analysis’ (2007) 30 Hastings Int’l & Comp Law Rev. 477.
94 Willmott, White, and Downie (n 90) 907.
95 D Morgan, Issues in Medical Law and Ethics (Cavendish: London 2001), 90.
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France,96 Germany, and Portugal. In Ireland and India, however, the legal position appears
to be the same as that of English law: declaratory relief from the courts must be sought,
even where families and clinicians agree that withdrawal of CANH is appropriate.
Additionally, our national rapporteur data reveal that in (at least) two countries the
withdrawal of CANH is not legally permitted. In Israel, it seems it is not permitted at
all. In Italy, withdrawal of CANH is not permitted unless the patient has expressed in
advance a wish to refuse medical treatment in that condition. Such a refusal would be
most clearly expressed by way of a written advance decision, though a court, as a
matter of proof, may conclude that an advance refusal of treatment has been made on
the basis of evidence provided by family and friends.97
The legal position in Scotland is worth considering in a little more detail, particu-
larly given its position as a sister jurisdiction within the UK. There is no equivalent in
Scotland to the English Court of Protection Practice Direction requiring all cases to
be brought before the courts. Indeed, the only reported case is Law Hospital NHS
Trust v Lord Advocate,98 heard in 1996. Here, the court adopted a broadly similar pos-
ition to the Bland case. Lord President Hope said:
I wish to emphasise that nothing in this opinion is intended to suggest that an
application must be made to the court in every case where it is intended to
withdraw treatment. The decision as to whether an application is necessary
must rest in each case with those who will be responsible for carrying that inten-
tion into effect, having regard in particular to the views of the patient’s relatives
and any statements of policy which may, in the light of this case, be issued by
the Lord Advocate.99
Policy guidance was, indeed, subsequently issued. Its most recent iteration states that:
. . . immunity from prosecution does not automatically extend to medical practi-
tioners who have not sought and received the authority of the Court. The Lord
Advocate has expressed the view, however, that if doctors and those acting on their
instructions were acting in accordance with accepted medical practice and had
exercised the proper degree of care expected of them, it would be very unlikely
that any prosecution in the public interest would be brought against them.100
In light of this ofﬁcial guidance, there might legitimately be a suspicion that Scottish
doctors do not feel obliged to seek declaratory relief from the court. However, for the
96 A judgment of the French Conseil d’Etat that a doctor’s decision to withdraw CANH from a vegetative
patient was lawful is currently being considered by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights (Lambert and others v France: application no. 46043/14). The applicants claim, inter alia, that the
withdrawal of treatment would constitute a breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. There was a hearing of
the Grand Chamber on 7 January 2015. The judgment will be issued in due course.
97 See FG Pizzetti, Alle Frontiere della Vita: Il Testamento Biologico Tra Valori Costituzionali e Promozione della
Persona (Giuffrè: Milano 2008); C Casonato, Introduzione al Biodiritto (G. Giappichelli: Torino 2009);
Pioggia, ‘Consenso informato e riﬁuto di cure: dal riconoscimento alla soddisfazione del diritto’ (2009) 3
Giornale di Diritto Amministrativo 21.
98 1996 SC 301.
99 Ibid, 319.
100 Death and the Procurator Fiscal (Crown Ofﬁce and Procurator Fiscal Service, 2008), para. 17.3.
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purposes of this analysis, it would be better to regard the legal position in Scotland as
a little uncertain.101 Accordingly, we may summarise our comparative ﬁndings by way
of Table 1.
As shown in the table, we can see that Professor Jennett was not entirely accurate
in suggesting that jurisdictions within the UK were unique as regards the requirement
of declaratory relief. However, the broader point that Jennett was making is probably
correct. Our data set is clearly not exhaustive of all foreign jurisdictions. Nonetheless,
there appears to a fairly broad international trend to permit withdrawal of CANH
without recourse to courts where families and health-care teams agree that it is appro-
priate to do. English law seems to inhabit a small pool of exceptions.
B. Is the Requirement of Declaratory Relief Incoherent Within the
Context of English Medical Law?
There are two ways of approaching this question. First, we may consider whether the
obligation to obtain declaratory relief is coherent within the context of English law’s
general approach towards medical treatment. Second, we may then supplement this
general discussion with comparisons of the procedural requirements relating to CANH
and patients in the PVS with the procedural requirements in other relevant treatment
situations. Speciﬁcally, we may compare the declaratory relief requirement with the
general procedural demands regarding the withholding or withdrawal of CANH from
patients who lack capacity [ie not conﬁned to patients in the PVS or the minimally con-
scious state (‘MCS’)]. We may also compare the declaratory relief requirement with the
procedural demands regarding the withholding or withdrawal from patients in the PVS
of life-sustaining treatment more generally (ie not conﬁned to CANH).
1. The General Legal Approach to Treatment Decision-Making
As is well known, a basic principle of English medical law is that patients may refuse
medical treatment, even where the refusal is likely to be to their detriment.102 The
basic logic of the law, then, is one of conservatism about the giving of treatment.
TABLE 1. Cross-jurisdictional comparison
Court decision
required
Court decision not required Withdrawal of
CANH not
permitted
Legal
position
unclear
England and
Wales, Northern
Ireland, Republic
of Ireland, India
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, USA
Italy, Israel Scotland
101 See, for example, JK Mason and GT Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 9th edn, 2013).
102 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 645; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC
789; Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL, 4.
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There should not be treatment without consent.103 Thus, in relation to a course of treat-
ment, when consent is withdrawn, treatment should be withdrawn. Likewise, where adults
lack the capacity to give consent, the law maintains a conservative approach to treatment.
As the Supreme Court noted in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v
James,104 ‘the focus is on whether it is in the patient’s best interests to give the treatment,
rather than on whether it is in his best interests to withhold or withdraw it.’105 As soon as
a course of treatment is no longer in a patient’s best interests, it ceases to be lawful to
administer it.106 Given this essentially cautious approach to the lawfulness of administering
medical treatment, we might question the coherence of requiring declaratory relief before
CANH may be withdrawn from patients in the PVS where clinicians and families agree
that it is an appropriate course of action. As we shall see further below, the requirement
of obtaining declaratory relief usually causes a signiﬁcant delay between the decision to
withdraw CANH and its actual cessation. In this particular sense, then, declaratory relief,
rather than protecting patients’ interests, may actually be taken to be doing the opposite:
it delays the treatment decision that is in the patient’s best interests. Unlike cases where
the patient has been diagnosed as being in the MCS, such delay is not required for the
purposes of the judicial scrutiny of the best interests determination.107 The question of
best interests has already been settled as a matter of law by the Bland case.
Delaying the actual withdrawal of CANH in such cases thus seems to sit in tension
with the general thrust of the law here.108 The extent of this tension can be illustrated
by comparing procedural requirements relating to CANH decisions for patients in the
PVS with the procedural requirements in other relevant treatment situations.
2. Comparing Withdrawal of CANH from Patients in the PVS with Other
Withdrawal/ Withholding Decisions
The general position in English law is that, although good practice may require
medical practitioners to seek declaratory relief where the legality of proposed treat-
ment is in doubt, there is no general legal obligation to do so.109 As we can see from
the Bland case, such was the position in relation to the withdrawal of CANH from
patients in the PVS prior to the terms of the Code of Practice of the Mental Capacity
Act 2005110 and the corresponding Court of Protection Rules.111 These provisions
have thus made an exception to the general legal principle.112
103 The exception to this general principle, of course, is where necessity demands treatment despite the
absence of consent (Re F [1990] 2 AC 1). Such has been codiﬁed in relation to incapax patients by s. 5 of
the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
104 [2013] UKSC 67.
105 Per Lady Hale, para. 22.
106 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
107 For a discussion of delays caused by litigation in the context of the best interests of infants, see G Birchley
and R Huxtable, ‘Critical Decisions for Critically Ill Infants: Principles, Processes, Problems’ in Fovargue
and Mullock (n 24).
108 See also C Kitzinger and J Kitzinger, ‘Family Perspectives on Proper Medical Treatment’ in Fovargue and
Mullock (n 24).
109 Burke v General Medical Council [2005] EWCA 1003.
110 Para. 6.18.
111 Practice Direction 9E, para. 5.
112 The Code of Practice provides that the following decisions should also be brought before a court: (1)
cases involving organ or bone marrow donation by a person who lacks capacity to consent, (2) cases
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Nonetheless, the question of good medical practice is also relevant here. How does
the legal requirement of declaratory relief for withdrawal/withholding of CANH from
patients in the PVS compare with good practice requirements surrounding CANH
decisions more generally? In this respect too, it seems, the legal requirement is excep-
tional. As noted already above, the BMA sees no reason to differentiate between deci-
sions for patients in the PVS and those for patients with other very serious conditions
(other than MCS) where CANH is not considered to be a beneﬁt, which are currently
governed by established practice without the need for legal review.113 Equally, the
guidance of the General Medical Council stipulates that, in relation to infants and
neonates, CANH may be withheld or withdrawn where there is a consensus between
the health-care team and the parents that it is not in the child’s best interests. Like-
wise, in relation to adults who lack capacity (but who are not in the PVS or MCS)
and are not expected to die within hours or days, CANH may be withheld or with-
drawn where it is assessed not to be of overall beneﬁt to the patient. In both contexts,
however, a second opinion from a senior clinician who has experience of the patient’s
condition must be sought.114 Second opinions should, if possible, be based on an
examination of the patient.115
In relation to patients in the PVS and life-sustaining treatments more generally, it
is important to note that CANH is not the only life-sustaining treatment provided.
Other life-sustaining treatments might include resuscitation in the event of cardio-
respiratory arrest, or the use of antibiotics in the case of a life-threatening illness.116 It
is not uncommon, for example, for patients in the PVS to develop pneumonia.117
Once again, we may note that there is no strict common law obligation for clinicians
to seek declaratory relief in relation to such treatment decisions. For sure, in the
Bland case, the courts stated that proposed withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments
should be subject to declaratory proceedings. However, this was framed not as a
matter of legal obligation, but as a matter of good practice—and only until a body of
experience and practice had built up.118 This common law position, as we have
already noted, has now been overridden by the Court of Protection Rules 2007.119
Yet, it seems to have overridden it only to the extent of decisions about CANH. It is
worth reminding ourselves that the Bland case focussed on the lawfulness both of
CANH and antibiotics treatment decisions.120 However, although it is not entirely
involving the proposed non-therapeutic sterilisation of a person who lacks capacity to consent to this (eg
for contraceptive purposes), and (3) all other cases where there is a doubt or dispute about whether a par-
ticular treatment will be in a person’s best interests (para. 8.18).
113 British Medical Association (n 16).
114 Treatment and Care Towards the End of Life: Good Practice in Decision-Making (General Medical Council,
2010), paras. 106 and 120.
115 Ibid, para. 121.
116 RCP (n 28).
117 See J Kitzinger and C Kitzinger, ‘The “Window of Opportunity” for Death After Severe Brain Injury:
Family Experiences’ (2012) 35 Sociol. Health Ill. 1095.
118 Per Lord Goff, at 873; per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 885; see also Burke v General Medical Council [2005]
EWCA 1003.
119 S.I. 2007/1744. The Court of Protection Rules 2007 are made under the authority of the Mental Capacity
Act 2005, ss. 51 and 52.
120 See, for example, Lord Goff at 863.
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clear,121 it seems that CANH decisions have been singled out as the only life-
sustaining treatment decisions for patients in the PVS requiring court approval. Such
is certainly the view of the RCP.122 Furthermore, the narrative within the case of Re
C123 offers an example of where a decision to withhold antibiotics from a patient in
the PVS was made without recourse to the courts. Research with family members
conﬁrms that this was not an isolated case.124 In respect of antibiotic treatment, it
appears that the law has tacitly accepted that sufﬁcient experience and practice have
built up for decisions to be made, absent declaratory relief.
It seems, then, that patients in both the PVS and MCS have been singled out as
requiring exceptional procedural protection in relation to CANH decision-making,
despite the fact that, unlike MCS cases, the question of best interests for PVS patients
has been settled as a matter of law. Equally, in relation to patients in the PVS, CANH
has been singled out amongst other life-sustaining treatment decisions as requiring
declaratory relief. As Lewis has suggested,125 there is no apparent legal rationale for
this special treatment. Thus, the requirement of declaratory relief does not cohere
well with broader English medical law.
C. To What Extent Is the Declaratory Relief Process Distressing for
Patients’ Families?
Interview data certainly conﬁrm that the declaratory relief process carries potential
emotional burdens for families. First, for some relatives, the prospect of declaratory
relief may be distressing because they feel that the court is an illegitimate forum for
such decisions to be made.126 For some relatives, the requirement to go to court is an
unwelcome legal intrusion into the family domain. Daisy, for example, wanted her
brother to be permitted to die, but rejected the authority of the court to make that
decision:
The decisions of the legal thing, that’s what made me most angry . . . [T]here
needs to be an option somehow. I mean, obviously you can’t just be, ‘Hey he’s
[in a minimally conscious state], let’s off him.’ But I don’t think it should be a
legal thing. I think it should be down to the doctors with the carers and it
should be a multi-disciplinary thing. I don’t think it is a legal matter.127
121 Practice Direction 9E, para. 5 offers a list of potential decisions that are to be regarded as ‘serious medical
treatment’ and that should be brought before the court for consideration. Whereas decisions to withdraw
or withhold CANH from PVS and MCS patients are speciﬁcally mentioned, the withholding or withdraw-
ing of other life-sustaining treatments (including antibiotics) is not. Yet, ‘serious medical treatment’ is
deﬁned as including: ‘providing, withdrawing or withholding treatment in circumstances where . . . the
treatment, procedure or investigation proposed would be likely to involve serious consequences for [the
patient].’ A decision to withhold antibiotics in the event of a life-threatening infection could, one might
argue, fall within this deﬁnition. The Code of Practice of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, however, envisages
that only CANH decisions must be brought to the court. See Sections 6.18 and 8.18.
122 RCP (n 28), Section 5.
123 [2010] EWHC 3448 (Fam), at para. 17.
124 See Kitzinger and Kitzinger (n 117).
125 Lewis (n 21).
126 This is discussed in greater depth in S Halliday, C Kitzinger, and J Kitzinger, ‘Law in Everyday Life and
Death: A Socio-Legal Study of Chronic Disorders of Consciousness’ (2014) 35 LS 55, 74.
127 Quoted in Halliday, Kitzinger, and Kitzinger (n 76), 71.
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Although Daisy’s brother was in the MCS, rather than PVS, we can presume that rela-
tives of patients in the PVS could share such an attitude towards the court. Indeed,
such seem to have been the Bland family’s initial feelings about the prospect of court
proceedings.128
Second, some relatives, like many lay people who face the prospect of involvement
in court procedure, feel some anxiety about the formalities of the process. Lillian, for
example, indicated that she ‘really didn’t know what to expect’ of the court hearing.
This caused her some anxiety, which was assuaged by a senior clinician with experi-
ence of the Court of Protection:
. . . at ﬁrst I was thinking, ‘Oh my God, are they going to be interrogating me?’
. . . Professor [Jones] said, ‘No . . . it’d be highly unlikely they’d ask a member
of the family to stand up and answer questions . . .’ [. . .] He said, ‘you know,
you don’t have to be there’.129
Finally, the delay to the ending of the patient’s life caused by the court process can be
very upsetting for some families. Families with a relative in the PVS routinely experi-
ence grief, anger, exhaustion, and despair in relation to their relative’s condition and
treatment.130 Although it can take years for some families to come to a position of
wanting their relative to be allowed to die,131 emotions around this desire can be
intense once it exists. The considerable delay associated with the legal process that
must currently follow the best interests decision to withdraw CANH is, for some, an
additional and difﬁcult burden. One family member said:
I still sort of question why it takes a year when three medical professionals are
saying there’s no hope. And then I realise it’s got to go through the legal
process . . . [T]hat will put another six months on it. So hopefully in . . . 18
months from starting we get the digniﬁed end that we want as a family.132
However, the emotional impact of the declaratory relief process on families is by no
means straightforward. Some relatives who discuss their negative perceptions of the
legal process also express positive emotions about it. Lillian, quoted above, although
being anxious about the formalities of court hearing, ultimately valued it. Another
relative, despite his concerns about delay, still valued the sense of due process that
declaratory relief offered:
These are momentous decisions that need to be done by a disinterested,
authoritative and experienced party [. . .] If you have a legal system, you can’t
128 Howe (n 57).
129 C Kitzinger and J Kitzinger, (2015 in press) ‘Court Applications for Withdrawal of Clinically Assisted
Nutrition and Hydration from Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State: Family Views and Experiences’ J
Med Ethics.
130 C Kitzinger and J Kitzinger, ‘Grief, Anger and Despair in Relatives of Seriously Brain-Injured Patients:
Responding Without Pathologizing’ (2014) 28 Clin. Rehabil. 627.
131 Kitzinger and Kitzinger (n 117).
132 Kitzinger and Kitzinger (n 129).
Court’s Role in the Withdrawal of Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration • 23
 by guest on Septem
ber 15, 2015
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
have people taking the law into their own hands . . . I still support the fact
you’ve got to have a system, you’ve got to stick to it.133
When assessing the emotional impact of the declaratory relief process, then, it is
better to see this in complex rather than simple terms. Relatives may have mixed emo-
tions that make it challenging to assess the legal requirement in this respect.
D. What Are the Economic Costs to the NHS of the Declaratory Relief Process?
One of the core empirical realities underpinning health economics as a discipline is
that limited budgets create difﬁcult choices. In the context of a cash-limited NHS
operating within a ﬁxed budget, investment in one form of medical intervention
comes at the cost of another. Accordingly, health economic analysis is often applied
to guide treatment policy within the conﬁnes of health service provision. The eco-
nomic cost of sustaining the lives of patients in the PVS and its implications for the
provision of health services to other patients are clearly relevant factors to be consid-
ered when debating and assessing broader policy about prolonged disorders of con-
sciousness. This is acknowledged both by members of the medical profession134 and
the courts (though the courts indicate that such debate is the province of Parlia-
ment).135 We must stress, however, that our aim in this section is much narrower and
less challenging: it is to assess the added costs to the NHS of the requirement of
declaratory relief in cases where health-care teams and families agree that the with-
drawal of CANH is appropriate.
The full details of our economic analysis and its assumptions can be found else-
where.136 For the purposes of this article, we present only the main ﬁgures. We
outline the additional costs incurred by the NHS ‘per case’ as a result of the declara-
tory relief requirement. It is not viable to estimate accurately the total savings to the
NHS that legal reform would bring, as no reliable data exist about the number of
patients in the PVS in England and Wales. (This is a problem that extends beyond
these shores.137) Equally, it would be difﬁcult to predict the overall effect of law
reform on families’ support for CANH withdrawal. Some families—those who are
intimidated or offended by the prospect of legal process—may be more willing to
support withdrawal of CANH if the need for declaratory relief were withdrawn. Yet, at
the same time, others may be less willing. As we noted above, some families place
value on the sense both of due process offered by court proceedings and of the court
taking responsibility for the decision to allow the patient to die.
A number of assumptions underpin our economic analysis. The ﬁrst is that the
NHS funds the application for declaratory relief. A review of the case law reveals that
133 Quoted in Halliday, Kitzinger, and Kitzinger (n 76), 66.
134 See, eg, D Wade, ‘Ethical Issues in Diagnosis and Management of Patients in the Permanent Vegetative
State’ (2001) 322 BMJ 352; Racine and others (n 56).
135 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, per Lord Hoffman in the Court of Appeal at 833; per Lord
Wilkinson-Browne in the House of Lords at 880; per Lord Goff at 896.
136 Formby, Cookson, and Halliday (n 25).
137 WS van Erp and others, ‘The Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome: A Systematic Review
of Prevalence Studies’ (2014) 21 Eur. J. Neurol. 1361. The little evidence that exists suggests that preva-
lence varies within a range of 0.2–6.1 patients per 100,000 members of the population.
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this is usually (though not always) the case.138 The second assumption relates to the
delay between a decision to withdraw CANH from a patient in the PVS and the dec-
laration of that decision’s lawfulness. Clearly, the actual time taken varies between
cases. Only a few of the published judgments detail the timelines involved. Our eco-
nomic analysis assumes that, on average, the delay is 9 months. This assumption
derives from discussions with clinicians and lawyers who have considerable experience
of the declaratory relief process. The calculation of the litigation costs also assumes
conservatively that only two court hearings take place: one preliminary directions
hearing and a ﬁnal hearing. Of course, in some cases, things may initially seem
straightforward but then later become contested: for example, if the expert medical
witness commissioned by the Ofﬁcial Solicitor raises unexpected concerns about the
PVS diagnosis requiring further medical assessment and a third hearing. Since this
only happens in a small proportion of cases, however, this would not substantially
increase our average cost estimates. So, to keep things simple and conservative, we do
not explicitly cost out this scenario. As regards litigation, the largest item of cost to
the NHS (constituting more than 80%) is the legal representation fees. This includes
100% of the fees for the barristers and solicitors acting for the applicant. We also
include 50% of the fees for the barristers and solicitors acting for the Ofﬁcial Solicitor
(who acts as the ‘litigation friend’ of the patient). By convention, these costs are also
borne by the applicant.
On the basis of these assumptions, we can estimate that the overall costs of the
declaratory relief process to the NHS per case are, on average, about £122,000, com-
prising around £53,000 in litigation costs and £69,000 in ongoing care costs. Figure 1
offers a sense of the rising overall costs with the passage of time.
Given the relatively small numbers of applications for declaratory relief from
patients in the PVS in England and Wales, the ﬁnancial costs to the NHS are tiny
Figure 1 Average cost of the declaratory relief process to the NHS per case.
138 The problem of families funding declaratory relief proceedings is discussed in W v M [2011] EWHC 2443
(Fam).
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relative to its overall budget. Although we have estimated that each case costs the
NHS around £122,000, the overall yearly budget of the NHS is in excess of £105
billion.139 Yet, the NHS exists for the beneﬁt of patients. Costs to the NHS are, ultim-
ately, costs to individual patients in terms of foregone health care and the loss of
health beneﬁts from that foregone health care. It may be appropriate, then, to frame
the costs of the declaratory relief process in terms of the standard measure of the
beneﬁt of health care used by the NHS: ‘QALYs’. The Quality-Adjusted Life Year is a
measure devised by health economists for estimating the beneﬁts produced by health
interventions. It constitutes a common currency that enables explicit cost/beneﬁt cal-
culations across a wide range of health interventions. QALYs are calculated by estimat-
ing the years of life remaining for a patient following a particular treatment or
intervention and weighting each year with a quality-of-life score (on a 0–1 scale).140
One QALY is equal to 1 year of life in full health. A year in less than full health will
score less than 1. There is evidence that, on average, every £13,000 (approximately)
of reduction in NHS expenditure causes the loss of at least one QALY.141 We can esti-
mate, then, that each declaratory relief application (in straightforward cases) takes
over 9 years of life (quality adjusted) from other patients.
V. DISCUSSION
What should we make of these data? Our discussion of them proceeds in three stages.
First, we can note that, in relation to straightforward cases where everyone is in agree-
ment, the analyses above can be grouped into ﬁve main areas where the costs and
gains of the declaratory relief process are felt: on patients, on families of patients, on
the public more generally, on doctors, and on the law itself. These are the principal
considerations that should populate a re-assessment of this question of law. Second,
we can note that not all the beneﬁts highlighted are necessarily tied to declaratory
relief. Some could be maintained in other ways, even if the blanket requirement of
declaratory relief were relaxed. Third, we must then consider the question of the
‘weight’ of the remaining considerations in relation to each other and how to drive
legal policy in light on competing concerns.
A. Five Main Considerations
As regards patients, the impact of the blanket declaratory relief requirement is some-
what mixed. With respect to patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness,
there is good reason to believe that the blanket requirement operates to provide
greater conﬁdence in PVS diagnoses. This is signiﬁcant, given the fact that the House
of Lords in Bland settled the question of best interests for patients in the PVS, whilst
in relation to patients in the MCS, the Court of Protection must determine each best
139 NHS Confederation, ‘Key Statistics on the NHS’ <http://www.nhsconfed.org/priorities/political-
engagement/Pages/NHS-statistics.aspx#funding> (last accessed 29 January 2015).
140 <https://www.nice.org.uk/glossary?letter=q> (last accessed 29 January 2015). Quality of life is often mea-
sured in terms of the patient’s ability to perform the activities of daily life, freedom from pain, and mental
disturbance.
141 K Claxton and others, Methods for the Estimation of the NICE Cost Effectiveness Threshold (University of
York, Centre for Health Economics: York, Research Paper 81, 2013). NICE itself applies a more conserva-
tive threshold of £20,000.
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interests question on its individual merits.142 The blanket declaratory relief require-
ment ensures in every PVS case both that the diagnostic guidelines of the RCP are
complied with and that a third expert conﬁrms the PVS diagnosis. It is not yet clear, it
is suggested, that the quality and conﬁdence of the PVS diagnosis would otherwise be
as high in every case. Yet, we can also see that the blanket requirement operates to
delay the course of action that is demanded by the best interests of most patients in
the PVS. The cases where the declaratory relief process has led to an initial PVS diag-
nosis being revised to one of MCS are very few in number.143 For most patients in
the PVS, then, the blanket declaratory relief requirement sits in some degree of
tension with their best interests.144 At the same time, we have also estimated that each
declaratory relief application takes over 9 years of life (quality adjusted) from other
NHS patients.
As regards the families of patients, the evidence is also mixed. For some, the declara-
tory relief process will be a burden, either because the legal control over a relative’s
death is offensive, and/or because of the delay the process brings, and/or because of
the anxiety that the legal process provokes—and some families may seek to avoid any
such process with the result that CANH might continue without review, regardless of
whether it is in the patient’s best interests. For other families, the process will bring ben-
eﬁts, either because of the sense of due process being followed, and/or because of the
authoritative reassurance it offers regarding the appropriateness of letting the relative
die, particularly where it relieves them of a sense of guilt or responsibility. For others
still, the declaratory relief process will be both beneﬁt and burden.
As regards the public more generally, the evidence is, strictly speaking, insufﬁcient.
There is good reason to suspect that, despite (and because of) the tortuous legal rea-
soning in this ﬁeld, many members of the public will equate withdrawal of CANH
with euthanasia. And for many in society, this will be ethically unacceptable. But we
simply do not know the extent to which the public needs reassurance about these
decisions, and, perhaps more signiﬁcantly, whether the declaratory relief process
would provide it.
With respect to doctors, we have seen that the Bland case provided certainty for
doctors that they would not face legal liability for CANH withdrawal from patients in
the PVS. Indeed, the subsequent upgrading of the declaratory relief requirement from
one of good practice to one of legal obligation under the Mental Capacity Act 2005
may well actually give rise to a risk of liability for contempt of court should the
declaratory relief requirement not be complied with.
142 The decision in W v M and others [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam) not to permit the withdrawal of CANH has
been criticised by a number of scholars. See, for example, A Mullock, ‘Deciding the Fate of a Minimally
Conscious Patient: An Unsatisfactory Balancing Act?’ (2012) 20 Med. L. Rev. 460; E Jackson, ‘The Minim-
ally Conscious State and Treatment Withdrawal: W v M’ (2013) 39 J. Med. Ethics 17. We do not address
this question in this article. Our position relates to the state of the law as it currently is.
143 Since the development of MCS as a diagnostic category in 2002, we know of this having happened only
twice:W v M and others [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam); and NHS Trust v L [2013] EWHC 4313 (Fam). It is
possible, of course, that in other cases revisions of diagnosis caused by preparations for declaratory relief
applications led to the abandonment of those proceedings.
144 For a consideration of this issue incorporating medical ethics, see C Constable, ‘Withdrawal of Artiﬁcial
Nutrition and Hydration for Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State: Changing Tack’ (2012) 26 Bioeth-
ics 157.
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And ﬁnally, we should recognise that particular legal provisions may carry costs
and beneﬁts for the law itself in terms of its overall coherence. We have seen that
English law is probably out of kilter with the international trend. This is not a cost, of
course, but could operate as a beneﬁt, should the law be changed. As the Bland deci-
sion demonstrates,145 domestic courts often engage in comparative scrutiny in the
course of their deliberations and can take some comfort from it when aligning domes-
tic law with an international trend.146 Nonetheless, we have also seen that the current
obligation to obtain declaratory relief in all cases lacks a clear legal rationale in the
context of domestic medical law. This must be considered to be a cost for the law.
B. Beneﬁts by Other Means
When systematically assessing the pros and cons of a particular legal obligation, there is
a risk of overlooking the fact that some of the societal beneﬁts offered by the legal obli-
gation may be obtained by other means. Reform of the legal obligation thus may not
necessitate the loss of all beneﬁts. Which of the beneﬁts outlined above may be main-
tained in other ways, should the blanket declaratory relief requirement be relaxed for
‘straightforward’ cases? Answering this question will help us focus on the central issues
that must dominate this overall assessment of the declaratory relief requirement.
As regards the reassurance of families, we have seen that declaratory relief can have
three main ‘therapeutic’ beneﬁts: (1) it can have a ceremonial function in moving the
family on from the unusual state of limbo, (2) it can afﬁrm the extreme difﬁculty
faced by families in such situations, and (3) it can reassure families about them not
being responsible for the death of their relatives. Each of these functions could, it is
suggested, be performed by carefully considered and formal best interests meetings
between health-care teams and family members. The recent clinical guidelines of the
RCP recommends that a formal best interests meeting takes place within 4 weeks of a
diagnosis of PVS (ie once it is deemed ‘permanent’, which will be at least 6 months to
a year after the original injury, depending on the nature of the injury). This meeting
should involve the treating team, the family, and the responsible health authority, and
its purpose should be ‘to decide whether continued life-sustaining treatment is in the
patient’s best interests’. It also recommends that families should be provided with
support that is ‘practical, emotional and psychological’, noting ‘anticipatory bereave-
ment work may be required’.147 Thoughtfully planned best interests meetings thus
could render the ‘therapeutic justice’ work of the courts unnecessary.
As regards the reassurance of the public, we have seen that the House of Lords in
Bland supported the notion that declaratory relief would help achieve this. Yet, we
have also seen that, because PVS is a chronic state of limbo—being ‘permanently’
caught between life and death—culturally, withdrawal of CANH ‘feels’ like medical
euthanasia. The unusual and distinctive blanket necessity of declaratory relief can only
145 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, per Lord Keith at 859; Lord Goff at 863; Lord Lowry at 876.
146 B Markesinis and J Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration? (Routledge:
London, 2006).
147 RCP (n 28) 77. See also Derick Wade’s commentary on the RCP guidelines: ‘Patients with Prolonged Dis-
orders of Consciousness: More than a Clinical Challenge’ (2014) 14 Pract. Neurol. 2; and Kitzinger and
Kitzinger (n 130).
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add to this cultural sense. There is thus a paradox in the fact that the attempts of the
court to give public reassurance may now actually (in some ways at least) achieve the
opposite: in terms of substantive law, CANH withdrawal from patients in the PVS is
no different from other treatment situations, and the cause of the death is the pre-
existing injury; in terms of procedural law, however, it is very different and has ele-
vated signiﬁcance in requiring prior court approval. To this extent, the law is giving
mixed messages. If public reassurance is a legitimate aim of the law here, surely it is
now time to offer that reassurance by not treating CANH decisions for patients in the
PVS as qualitatively different? Such equal treatment would serve to emphasise the
applicability to such decisions of the ordinary principles and practices of medical law:
that, in the absence of disagreements, doctors will withdraw treatment as soon as it is
no longer in the patient’s best interest.
At the same time, when considering the issue of public reassurance, we should not
ignore members of society who have opposing views to those noted above. For this
section of society, reassurance will relate to the upholding of human dignity in allow-
ing patients in the PVS to die as soon as continued life is not in their best interests. It
is worth recalling that both sets of core values were alluded to in the judgment by
Hoffman LJ in the Court of Appeal in the Bland case:
In my view the choice the law makes must reassure people that the courts do
have full respect for life, but that they do not pursue the principle to the point
at which it has become almost empty of any real content and when it involves
the sacriﬁce of other important values such as human dignity and freedom of
choice.148
Ultimately, public reassurance, should it come, may be better emanating from the
legislature rather than the court. Indeed, as we note further below, this would be a
requirement of legal reform in any event.
With respect to protecting doctors from legal liability, we have seen that, in the
main, this has been achieved through the terms of the substantive law set out in
Bland. Reform of the blanket requirement of declaratory relief would not alter this. As
regards the protection of patients, could the level of diagnostic conﬁdence currently
ensured by declaratory relief be achieved without it? As we saw above, the answer to
this question is ‘probably not’—at least for the moment. Thus, we arrive at the one
beneﬁt that currently is most clearly guaranteed by way of declaratory relief alone. It is
also the most signiﬁcant beneﬁt promised by it, we suggest. For these reasons, it must
take the central place in the discussion of whether the law should be reformed. It is to
this issue that we now turn.
C. How to Resolve Competing Considerations
The industry of law, including legal scholarship, is fond of the metaphor of
‘balance’.149 Indeed, even within the narrow ﬁeld of law being focussed on here, we
know that in MCS cases the Court of Protection must perform the impossible task of
148 [1993] 1 All ER 821 at 855, (1993) 12 BMLR 64 at 100.
149 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press: Harvard 1977).
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a ‘balance sheet’ exercise when deciding whether it is in a patient’s best interest to
withdraw CANH.150 The important point here is that the task really is impossible.
The metaphor of ‘balance’ is evocative, and may be reassuring, but is ultimately
false.151 It suggests that competing considerations are commensurable. But most
complex problems in law are such precisely because the issues cannot easily be mea-
sured against each other.
This, of course, is the problem we have here. How, for example, do we judge the
‘weight’ of greater conﬁdence in PVS diagnoses against the (quality-adjusted) life
years for other NHS patients? Or against the delays in implementing best interests
decisions of many patients in the PVS? Or against the potential distress of families
having to negotiate the declaratory relief process? In the absence of a common unit of
measurement, we must ﬁnd another approach to the resolution of our central ques-
tion. Our suggestion is that we can gain sufﬁcient clarity on this issue by ‘zooming
out’ from it for a moment and thinking about the role of medical law in its broader
socio-legal context.
The pragmatic and empirical context within which the principles of medical law
must do their work is the functioning of the NHS. The NHS budget (noted above) is
astronomically high because it treats over one million patients every 36 h.152 Medical
law is one of the ways (and a symbolically powerful one at that) by which the routine
work of the NHS is regulated. The regulatory effectiveness of medical law is achieved,
in the main, by the internalisation of legal values and principles as professional values
and principles, with only the very occasional intervention of litigation and the courts.
The vast majority of treatment decisions (including those for patients without cap-
acity and for the end of life) are made in the absence of direct legal involvement. This,
of course, is necessary for the efﬁcient operation of the NHS given the size of its
workload. Efﬁciency of public administration is itself a (sometimes undervalued) legal
value.153
However, there is a tiny minority of unusually demanding medical situations where
the law reserves decision-making for the courts alone. For the purposes of this ana-
lysis, we can note that, amongst others, the law has reserved decisions about whether
to treat patients in the MCS and PVS with CANH for the exclusive attention of the
court. This was understandable because the question of whether such treatment is in
the best interests of a patient is very challenging, given that these patients lack the cap-
acity to make treatment decisions themselves and that withdrawal of CANH will lead
to death. Courts are well suited to the unenviable task of resolving such difﬁcult and
consequential individual best interest decisions.154 For patients in the MCS, each case
is different and must be considered on its merits. For patients in the PVS, however,
the House of Lords, in deciding what was in the best interests of Anthony Bland,
determined it for all subsequent patients too. In that respect, all PVS cases are now
150 W v M and others [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam).
151 L Zedner, ‘Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reﬂections from Criminal Justice’ (2005) 32 J. Law &
Soc. 507.
152 <http://www.nhsconfed.org/resources/key-statistics-on-the-nhs> (last accessed 29 January 2015).
153 See S Halliday, Judicial Review and Compliance with Administrative Law (Hart Publishing: Oxford 2004).
154 Whereas Parliament is well suited to the unenviable task of resolving difﬁcult and consequential policy
decisions.
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the same. So, the Court of Protection is no longer routinely involved in best interests
decisions for patients in the PVS. Instead, its role is now restricted to conﬁrming diag-
noses as a matter of proof.155
Can this be justiﬁed? The courts have certainly long had a role in resolving claims
of negligent diagnosis. But that is not what is happening here. In relation to PVS and
intended CANH decisions, the court is actually supervising the diagnosis before a
treatment decision can be put into effect. Although it may have been appropriate that
the court was called on in Bland to resolve the particularly challenging best interests
decision, it is hard to think of a principled basis (outwith situations of dispute or dis-
agreement) for the courts’ continued involvement in PVS diagnostic decisions, now
that the best interest matter is settled. In the grand division of labour, medical diagno-
sis falls appropriately within the province of the health system and not the courts.
Nonetheless, we might still ask whether there is anything distinctive about PVS as
a diagnostic category that justiﬁes the unusual and direct judicial supervision of indi-
vidual diagnoses. The answer to this question is clearly and obviously ‘no’. It would
be strange to suggest that the court must supervise all PVS diagnoses. Rather, recalling
that diagnosis is an instrumental business, the better question is whether there are
speciﬁc and distinctive purposes for which PVS diagnoses are made that call for direct
judicial supervision of the diagnosis. To put the matter more concretely, is the
purpose of letting a patient die sufﬁciently distinctive and unusual that it calls for
direct judicial supervision of the diagnosis itself? Again, we suggest the answer is ‘no’.
The truth is that end-of-life treatment withdrawal/withholding on the basis of
medical diagnosis is routine within the NHS.156 Indeed, as we saw above, the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 and its associated Code of Practice and Rules of Court appear to
have tacitly accepted that doctors may make judicially unsupervised best interests
decisions to withhold antibiotics or cardiopulmonary resuscitation from patients in
the PVS on the basis of judicially unsupervised diagnoses. The current requirement
for the PVS diagnosis to be conﬁrmed in court before CANH may be withheld or
withdrawn is truly anomalous.
VI . CONCLUSION
In this article, we have argued that it is time for the blanket declaratory relief require-
ment before CANH may be withheld or withdrawn from patients in the PVS to be
reformed. Yet, at the same time, we have recognised that this is a sensitive policy issue
and that it is likely that some level of public reassurance would be prudent (on both
sides of the debate). From whom should such reassurance come? We are, unfortu-
nately, at risk of being caught in law reform stalemate. When the issue of declaratory
relief was debated during the passage of the Mental Capacity Bill, the government
indicated that it preferred to wait for the courts to take the reform initiative:
155 For this reason, we respectfully disagree with Lewis when she suggests that the court is ‘rubber-stamping’
the decision of doctors. See Lewis (n 21).
156 See, for example, J Way, A Black, and JR Curtis, ‘Withholding Life Support and Resolution of Conﬂict with
Families’ (2002) 325 BMJ 1342.
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Case law has set out . . . categories of case that should have prior sanction of
the court [including] the discontinuance of artiﬁcial nutrition and hydration for
a patient in a permanent vegetative state . . . The Government intend the
situation . . . to continue under the Bill. The current law has developed by guid-
ance in case law responding to difﬁcult cases. We want the courts to continue to
decide which cases should have their prior sanction [. . .] For that reason, we
consider that it would be most effective to use the codes of practice to specify
the situations where decisions should be taken only by a court.157
This was, perhaps, an important and skilful way of securing a successful conclusion to
a very long-running and complex legislative process.158 However, it is something of a
fudge. The higher courts may, of course, give a signal that procedures should change,
but it is not necessary before reform can take place. Indeed, such a change would for-
mally have to come from the legislature in any event. The Court of Protection
Rules159 have been made under the power of the Mental Capacity Act 2005160 and so
have the authority of statute. Equally, although the Lord Chancellor is empowered to
make revisions to the Code of Practice, a new code would have to be laid before both
Houses of Parliament.161 It is hoped that in due course there will be the opportunity
to do so in relation to cases where families and health-care teams agree that with-
drawal of CANH is in the PVS patient’s best interests.
FUNDING
This article was part-funded by Research Priming Funds provided by the Welcome
Trust [ref: 097829/Z/11/A] via the University of York.
157 Baroness Ashton, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Department for Constitutional Affairs, HL Deb, 25
January 2005, c1240.
158 The Law Commission ﬁrst published its report in 1995: Mental Incapacity (Law Commission Report 231,
1995). The Green Paper was published in 1997:Making Decisions on behalf of Mentally Incapacitated Adults
(Green Paper, Cm 3803, 1997).
159 S.I. 2007/1744.
160 Sections 51 and 52.
161 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 43(2).
32 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
 by guest on Septem
ber 15, 2015
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
